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INDEPENDENCE V. ACCOUNTABILITY:
FINDING A BALANCE AMIDST THE
CHANGING POLITICS OF STATE-COURT
JUDICIAL SELECTION
THE HONORABLE DIANE S. SYKES
This year’s contest for a pivotal seat on our state supreme court was
unusual for Wisconsin, and not just because, for the first time in forty-one
years, an incumbent justice was unseated. The election was predominated—
some might say overwhelmed—by millions of dollars in saturation
advertising on television, much of which was crass, misleading, and at times
utterly inconsistent with the judicial role. Most of these ads were sponsored
by third-party interest groups operating independently for or against the
candidates, although one particularly base and deceptive attack ad was
sponsored by the campaign of the victorious challenger. The candidate
debates were generally unilluminating because the questions tended to focus
on the subject of the negative advertising, as did much of the newspaper
coverage of the race. Justice Louis Butler, who was defeated by Burnett
County Circuit Judge Michael Gableman, did not himself engage in this sort
of advertising, to his credit and the credit of the judicial office he will soon
relinquish.
This election, together with last year’s (which had some of the same
characteristics), has set off a debate about whether our system of judicial
selection is broken, and if so, what should be done to fix it. Some—including
all seven sitting justices of the supreme court—have strongly advocated
campaign finance reform, including substantial public funding of supreme
court campaigns.1 Others suggest doing away with judicial elections
altogether. The Wisconsin State Journal editorialized in favor of replacing
supreme court elections with so-called ―merit selection‖ of supreme court
justices. 2 The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel also endorsed the appointment of

This speech was presented during the Eastern District of Wisconsin Bar Association’s annual
meeting on April 17, 2008, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. It has been updated for publication.

Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
1. See Letter from Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson et al., Supreme Court of Wis. (Dec. 10,
2007), http://www.wicourts.gov/news/archives/2007/docs/campaignfinanceletter.pdf.
2. Editorial, For Supreme Court: Merit Reform; The Butler-Gableman Campaign Has
Demonstrated How Money and Politics Have Tainted Wisconsin’s Supreme Court Elections, WIS.
ST. J., Mar. 23, 2008, at B3.
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justices after taking up the ―elect or appoint‖ debate in the Sunday opinion
section.3 In a forum in the paper’s ―Crossroads‖ section, State Representative
Fred Kessler promoted his proposal for a constitutional amendment that
would replace supreme court elections with a system based on the federal
model, only somewhat modified; he proposed that justices be appointed by the
governor, confirmed by the state senate, and automatically reappointed after a
ten-year term unless a supermajority of the senate votes against
reappointment.4 Representative Kessler argued that shifting to an appointed
supreme court would curb the ―outlandish amounts of money‖ spent by
outside interest groups on high-court elections and preserve the public’s
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. 5
Marquette Law School Professor Rick Esenberg argued the other side. 6
He maintained that judicial elections are imperfect but preferable to the
alternatives and ought to be retained. 7 He acknowledged that an appointment
system may better serve the interest of impartiality, but said protecting that
interest would come ―at the expense of accountability.‖8 He also noted that
appointment doesn’t eliminate the politics, ―it just moves it from the
campaign trail to the hearing room and, of course, the back room.‖ 9 The
pitched partisan battles over nominees to the United States Supreme Court—
and some lower federal-court nominees as well—are evidence of that.
It is not my purpose nor is it appropriate for me to comment more
specifically on the results of the recent supreme court election or the calls for
campaign finance reform that have come in its wake. However, I do have
substantial personal familiarity with both the appointment and election models
of judicial selection, having navigated a contested countywide circuit court
race, a gubernatorial appointment to a mid-term vacancy on the state supreme
court, a contested statewide election for a full term on the court, and the
federal nomination and confirmation process for my present position on the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. After my campaign for the supreme court
in 2000, I gave a series of speeches to law students and civic groups
defending judicial elections. It has become increasingly difficult to do so, but

3. Editorial, Appointing Justices: After Two Nasty Campaigns that Have Harmed the
Credibility of Wisconsin’s Highest Court, It’s Time to Change the Way that the State Selects Justices,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 16, 2008, at 10A.
4. Frederick P. Kessler, Op-Ed., Elect or Appoint? To Maintain Integrity, Appoint Justices,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 13, 2008, at 1J.
5. Id.
6. Rick Esenberg, Op-Ed., Elect or Appoint? Judicial Elections Are an Imperfect, Best Option,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 13, 2008, at 1J.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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as Professor Esenberg observed, the alternatives have their flaws too. If we
are about to have a public discussion on the subject of judicial selection—and
I think we should—a little historical perspective might be useful.
We have been debating the issue of judicial selection for more than 200
years. At the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, there was a
debate over the establishment of inferior federal courts, including the subject
of who should appoint the judges of the lower federal courts—Congress or the
President.10 James Wilson of Pennsylvania argued in favor of presidential
appointment, as with the Supreme Court, in order to avoid the ―intrigue,
partiality and concealment‖ that would attend appointment by the legislative
body.11 John Rutledge of South Carolina strongly disagreed, arguing that
―[t]he people . . . will think we are leaning too much towards monarchy.‖ 12
Catherine Drinker Bowen, in her classic Miracle at Philadelphia, describes
how the impasse was broken:
As the debate mounted, Dr. Franklin interposed mildly.
Only two modes of choosing the judges, he said, had so far
been mentioned; it was a point of great moment and he
wished other modes might be suggested. He would like to
mention one which he understood was practiced in Scotland.
He then [according to an account contained in James
Madison’s notes], ―in a brief and entertaining manner related
a Scotch mode, in which the nomination proceeded from the
lawyers, who always selected the ablest of the profession in
order to get rid of him, and share his practice among
themselves.‖ Here in America, on the other hand, it was the
interest of the electors to make the best choice. 13
The author continues:
[W]hen this particular old man told a story it was impossible
not to be diverted. Madison moved that in the ninth Resolve
the words ―appointment by the legislature‖ be struck out, and
a blank left ―to be hereafter filled on maturer reflection.‖ In
[the] Committee of the Whole the states voted, approving
nine to two. 14

10. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 65 (1966).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 66.
14. Id.
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The framers of the Federal Constitution, of course, opted for presidential
appointment for all federal judges, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and lifetime tenure in good behavior. This was thought to be the mode of
judicial selection most conducive to the independence of the judiciary and the
preservation of the rule of law. Alexander Hamilton described the rationale
for presidential appointment and lifetime tenure in The Federalist No. 78:
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the
bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative
encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong
argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since
nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent
spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful
performance of so arduous a duty.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the
effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men or
the influence of particular conjunctures sometimes
disseminate among the people themselves; and which, though
they speedily give place to better information and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to
occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and
serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. . . .
....
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the
Constitution and of individuals, which we perceive to be
indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be
expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary
commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated or
by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal
to their necessary independence. If the power of making
them was committed either to the Executive or [the]
legislature, there would be danger of an improper
complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both,
there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of
either; if to the people or to persons chosen by them for the
special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to
consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be
consulted but the Constitution and the laws. 15
15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 230–31, 232 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d.
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At the time of the ratification of the Federal Constitution, most state-court
judges were appointed by one of two methods: legislative appointment or
gubernatorial appointment subject to legislative confirmation. 16 The latter
method was similar to the federal model, although it was considered to be
substantially more democratic since at that time neither the President nor the
Senate was directly elected. 17
By the time of Andrew Jackson’s presidency, however, concern for
judicial independence was being replaced by concern for judicial
accountability.18
Jacksonian populism, and its preference for direct
democracy, took hold. 19 Insulating judges from political accountability was
seen as antidemocratic and likely to produce an aristocratic, arbitrary, and
unresponsive judiciary.20
Mississippi became the first state to provide for the direct election of
appellate judges in 1832.21 Between 1846 and 1860 there were sixteen state
constitutional conventions; all but two provided for the popular election of
both appellate- and inferior-court judges. 22 By the Civil War, most states had
converted to direct election of state supreme court and lower court judges. 23
With the admission of Missouri in 1832 and continuing through 1958, every
state that entered the Union provided by constitution for an elected judiciary, 24
some partisan, some nonpartisan.
Wisconsin, of course, was among these, achieving statehood in 1848. 25
Our entire state judiciary is elected and nonpartisan. However, Alexander
Stow, one of the first justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, was utterly
opposed to an elected judiciary and accepted the position with the promise
that he would not run for a second term. 26 He kept his word and left the bench
after two and a half years of service. 27

ed. 1966).
16. Stephen B. Presser et al., Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case for Judicial
Appointments, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 353, 356 (2002).
17. Id. at 356–57.
18. Id. at 358.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 359.
21. Id. at 358.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. PORTRAITS OF JUSTICE : THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ’S FIRST 150 YEARS 1 (Trina E.
Gray et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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At least one observer of American democracy saw some danger in the
shift toward elected judiciaries. Alexis de Tocqueville noted:
Under some [state] constitutions the judges are elected and
subject to frequent reelection. I venture to predict that sooner
or later these innovations will have dire results and that one
day it will be seen that by diminishing the magistrates’
independence, not judicial power only but the democratic
republic itself has been attacked.28
The Progressive reform movement of the early twentieth century saw the
development of yet another method of judicial selection, the so-called ―merit
selection‖ process.29 Motivated by a desire to protect the judiciary from the
extreme partisanship, cronyism, and corruption that tended to pervade the
other branches of government, Progressive reformers in bar associations and
―good government‖ groups pushed a proposal first developed in 1914 by a
professor at Northwestern University School of Law. 30
The proposal called for judicial nominations to proceed from a committee
of experts, mostly lawyers selected by the organized bar, or some combination
of the organized bar and the appointing authority (typically the governor). 31
The committee would screen candidates and develop a list of finalists for the
governor, who would then fill judicial vacancies by appointing someone from
the selection committee’s list.32 The appointee would take office, subject only
to an up-or-down retention election in the next general election cycle and
periodic retention elections thereafter.33 In theory, the process would be
nonpartisan, impartial, and merit based, maximizing the role of legal
professionals who, it was thought, were better equipped than politicians or the
general public to evaluate the qualifications of potential judges. 34 The
retention-election feature of the system was designed to afford some level of
public accountability.35
Missouri was the first state to adopt the so-called merit-selection method
of judicial selection in 1940.36 For a while no other state followed suit. 37

28. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 247 (J. P. Mayer & Max Lerner
eds., George Lawrence trans., 1966).
29. Presser et al., supra note 16, at 361.
30. Id. at 360–61.
31. Id. at 361–62.
32. Id. at 362.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Then, between 1958 and 1976, nineteen states converted to this method of
judicial selection.38 In addition, several others adopted some form of merit
selection in combination with other methods. 39 So today, Benjamin
Franklin’s mischievous suggestion at the constitutional convention that the
lawyers should choose the judges has in a sense come to pass in
approximately half the states. Twenty-one states continue to select judges by
partisan or nonpartisan direct election. 40 The rest adhere to the gubernatorialor legislative-appointment model. 41
The debate over state-court judicial selection has been rekindled by recent
trends in state supreme court elections around the country, which have come
to resemble legislative- and executive-branch elections in their rhetoric and
expense. High-court races in many states have become multimillion-dollar
propositions, with legislative-style rhetoric to match. Campaigns are
increasingly run on exaggerated crime-and-punishment templates, to the
exclusion of any broader discussion of legal philosophy. Special-interest
organizations that used to involve themselves only in legislative- or executivebranch races have become intensely interested in state high-court politics and
are prepared to spend enormous amounts of money to influence these races.42
Judicial campaigns in Wisconsin have historically suffered from a
different sort of problem: Most were low-interest affairs in which the
candidates had relatively modest budgets and limited opportunities to
communicate with voters about their qualifications, experience, and judicial
philosophy. The media paid little attention. Lawyers and bar associations,
elected officials, labor organizations, and civic groups like the Rotary,
Kiwanis, and local men’s, women’s, and senior-citizen clubs were the typical
stops on the campaign trail. Paid advertising was important too, but it
generally stuck to touting the candidate’s experience and endorsements—
especially endorsements from sheriffs and law-enforcement groups, prized for
their ability to validate the candidate’s law-and-order credentials, which most
voters look for in a judge. These ads were typically illustrated by footage of
courtrooms, gavels, handcuffs, jail cells, and pictures of the candidate talking
with police officers—not terribly illuminating on the qualities necessary in a
good judge, but at least not harmful to the public’s understanding of the
judicial function. It could reasonably be argued that these old-style judicial
37. Michael DeBow et al., Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case for Partisan Judicial
Elections, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 393, 395 (2002).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial
Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. P OL’Y 273, 278 (2002).
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elections provided so little information to the voting public as to make judicial
elections nothing more than meaningless contests over name recognition.
We are now experiencing the opposite extreme. Throughout the 1990s,
we saw increasingly expensive and hard-fought supreme court races
characterized by sharp rhetoric on hotly contested legal issues and greater
participation by third-party interest groups. Still, we managed to avoid the
bruising, big-money battles over control of our supreme court that many other
states were experiencing. Now they have arrived, and I suspect they’re
probably here to stay.
This development, I think, is a predictable byproduct of the increased
litigiousness of our society, the legislative responses to it, and the expanding
use of the courts to bring about public-policy change. Special-interest
combatants in the legislative process increasingly look to the courts to block
disfavored legislation or to impose their public-policy preferences through
litigation when they fail to accomplish their objectives through legislation.
More fundamentally, these costly and rhetorically excessive high-court
campaigns are a reaction to the struggle going on in state supreme courts
around the country—ours included—over the proper role of the judiciary and
the method of legal interpretation best suited to maintaining the balance of
power between the judiciary and the other branches of government.
Broadly speaking, it is a struggle between conservative or textualist and
liberal or purposivist judges. Labels are tricky, but to generalize, the former
look to neutral principles and sources of interpretation that operate to limit
judicial discretion: the text, structure, and history of the state and federal
constitutions and laws; precedent; and traditional rules of legal interpretation.
This approach tends to be more restrained in the use of judicial power and
therefore more sensitive to separation of powers and the prerogatives of the
other branches of government. On the other side of the philosophical divide
are those who subscribe to a more expansive view of the judicial role and see
the law as a malleable instrument through which judges should try to achieve
the ―right‖ or ―best‖ or ―just‖ result. These judges are more inclined to look
behind the language and structure of the law to discover and implement the
purpose the judge ascribes to it, more willing to modify traditional interpretive
methods, and less inclined to defer to the other branches of government. This
struggle has obvious consequences for judicial politics.
To return to The Federalist No. 78, Hamilton famously said that the
judiciary has ―neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment,‖ and that ―[t]o
avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should
be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point
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out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.‖ 43 These ―rules
and precedents‖ operate as internal constraints on the judges to guard against
any ―deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature.‖ 44 The
Federalists believed that because judges were bound by the requirements of
traditional judicial method, and because the judiciary had neither purse nor
sword, only a comparatively weak external check—the possibility of
impeachment—was necessary to maintain the balance of power.45 Federal
judges, appointed for life and removable only by impeachment, enjoy the
highest degree of decisional independence.
Not so an elected judiciary. My colleague Judge Posner has written a new
book called How Judges Think.46 I haven’t read the whole book yet, but in the
opening chapters he discusses (among other things) an economic theory of
judicial behavior that consists of evaluating the relative strengths of the
internal and external constraints on judges. 47 Elections operate as an external
constraint on state judges’ job performance. There is no question that this
weakens judicial independence—that’s the whole point. Independence and
accountability are important, but conflicting, values. In choosing an elected
judiciary, Wisconsin has accepted a reduction in judicial independence in
order to achieve a greater level of judicial accountability.
In the ordinary course, the internal constraints on judges operate to
prevent this from becoming too great a sacrifice. Most of the time, judges
who do not stray too far too fast from the judicial mainstream are reelected,
often without opposition. But if the judges start loosening the internal
constraints on the use of their power by altering the rules of interpretation too
much or too swiftly—and therefore expanding their own power—the other
branches of government and those who have an interest in the work of the
courts will take notice, and the external constraint of the ballot box will kick
in.
The price of direct electoral judicial accountability may be too high.
Judges do not represent constituents, nor do they implement the will of the
people as other elected officials do.
Professor Esenberg notes the
countermajoritarian character of some of our most important legal rights—
freedom of speech, for example, and the procedural rights of criminal
defendants—and is rightly concerned about the possibility that elected judges
are influenced by the ballot-box consequences of their decisions. 48 Judges

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 227, 232–33.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 245 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d. ed. 1966).
Id.
RICHARD A. P OSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008).
See generally id.
Esenberg, supra note 6.
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cannot consult popular opinion in deciding cases but (to use Hamilton’s words
again) must ―justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the
Constitution and the laws.‖49 We do not know the extent to which the threat
of defeat in the next election might inhibit judges from making unpopular
decisions dictated by law.
The colossal amount of money now spent on state high-court elections
also leaves the troubling impression of influence-buying. I am not suggesting
there is anything inherently sinister about interest-group participation in
electoral politics; the people have every right to organize for the purpose of
influencing elections.
I am also not suggesting that special-interest
participation in a judicial election means the judge who happened to benefit
from that participation is ethically compromised. This is a problem of
perception more than reality; we are not living in a John Grisham novel, at
least not in Wisconsin.50 Our ethics rules prohibit judges and judicial
candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions.51 Funds are
raised by the judge’s campaign committee, and contributions are limited in
size and subject to reporting and other requirements of state campaign finance
law. 52 Receipt of a contribution from a lawyer or citizen does not
automatically disqualify the judge from later hearing a case involving a
contributing lawyer as counsel or a contributing citizen as litigant. 53
However, special-interest spending on state high-court races now far exceeds
the candidates’ own spending, and the staggering totals have prompted calls
for new rules governing judicial recusal in cases involving direct contributors
or third-party interests.
But remember that candidates for the supreme court have no control over
the spending of outside interest groups; in Wisconsin coordination between a
justice’s campaign and third-party organizations is illegal.54 Requiring
recusal based on conduct over which the candidate has no control is ethically
unnecessary and could subject the court to gross political manipulation.
Disqualification decisions on a court of last resort are highly sensitive and
difficult and sometimes affect the outcome of the case. The sideshow created
by the clamor for justices to recuse themselves because of money raised and
spent during an election55 threatens to disrupt the work of the court and
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 232.
See generally JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008).
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(4).
WIS. STAT. §§ 11.06, 11.12, 11.26 (2005–2006).
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.03, 60.04(4), 60.06(4).
WIS. STAT. § 11.06(7).
See, e.g., JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS: SETTING
RECUSAL
STANDARDS
(2008),
available
at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/1afc0474a5a53df4d0_7tm6brjhd.pdf.
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undermine the public’s confidence in its decisions. The United States
Supreme Court will this term hear a case from West Virginia involving a state
supreme court justice who cast the deciding vote throwing out a large jury
verdict against a corporation whose CEO spent $3 million to get that justice
elected to the court.56 More than $500,000 of that total was spent directly on
advertising in support of the justice’s candidacy; the balance went to a
special-interest group for the same purpose. 57
Finally, the new era ushered in by this year’s election also brings the
danger that the ongoing, important philosophical clash over the role of the
state supreme court will simply get lost in the political din. Crude, negative,
and sometimes downright dishonest advertising appears to have overtaken our
judicial elections, which have now descended into the partisan and specialinterest power struggles that other states have experienced. This phenomenon
certainly has the potential to exact too great a toll on judicial independence,
distort the electorate’s understanding of the judicial function, and shake public
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.
But no method of judicial selection is perfect; all are prone to
manipulation and politicization of some sort. The problem exists in federal
judicial selection too, which has in some cases pretty much deteriorated into
raw power politics. Special-interest coalitions now routinely subject federal
judicial nominees to ideological litmus tests and distort records and attack
reputations in order to defeat some nominees.
We have basically three choices when it comes to picking judges: We can
have the people do it directly by partisan or nonpartisan election; we can have
the people do it indirectly by executive or legislative appointment; or we can
have lawyers do it, in combination with the executive by the so-called meritselection approach. There are a number of problems with having lawyers do
it. Merit-selection committees are totally unaccountable, and this method of
choosing judges promotes a culture in which the bar—instead of the public
and the rule of law—becomes the primary constituency for any judicial
aspirant. The merit-selection committees in some states are susceptible of
being captured and dominated by the more active and politicized elements of
the organized bar, and sometimes have an underrepresentation of prosecutors
and those who represent businesses.
Having said that, however, there are plenty of drawbacks to judicial
elections, as I have already noted, and the various proposals for campaign
finance reform, from public financing to restrictions on independent
56. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2008 WL 918444 (W. Va. Apr. 3, 2008),
cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3051 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2008) (No. 08-22); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
2, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. July 2, 2008), 2008 WL 2676568.
57. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 56, at 7.
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expenditures, are legally and politically controversial and may create more
problems than they solve.
It may be that the recent trends in our supreme court elections will abate.
It is not impossible to elevate the level of discourse and still articulate the
philosophical differences that exist between judicial candidates so that the
public understands what’s at stake. Drawing these philosophical contrasts
does not require playing on voters’ fears or hitting them between the eyes
with images of bloody knives, dead bodies, empty swings, and mug shots of
child molesters.
But if these trends continue, and if merit-selection systems are less
desirable from an accountability standpoint, then it may be that the federal
model of executive appointment with or without legislative confirmation will
emerge as the best way to maintain judicial independence, along with at least
some level of public accountability in the state courts. Governors, like
presidents, will be inclined to appoint judges of conservative or liberal judicial
philosophy, depending upon their own philosophical approaches to
government, which the voters have explicitly endorsed by electing them to
office.
This is not always the case, however, and many a president and governor
has been surprised by a judicial appointee. When Chief Justice Roger Taney
died in 1864, President Lincoln was well aware that the greenback legislation,
which had been used to finance the Civil War effort, as well as measures
pertaining to emancipation, would eventually be challenged in the Supreme
Court.58 In deciding on his nominee, Lincoln is reported to have said to a
confidant:
[W]e wish for a Chief Justice who will sustain what has been
done in regard to emancipation and the legal tenders. We
cannot ask a man what he will do, and if we should, and he
should answer us, we should despise him for it. Therefore we
must take a man whose opinions are known.59
Lincoln made what he expected would be a safe choice: Salmon Chase, his
secretary of the Treasury, who had been the architect of the greenback
legislation.60 Chief Justice Chase wrote the first opinion (later overruled) in
the so-called ―Legal Tender Cases‖ striking down the greenback legislation as

58. See 2 GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, REMINISCENCES OF SIXTY YEARS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 29
(Greenwood Press 1968) (1902).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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unconstitutional. 61 On the other hand, President John Adams, who appointed
the great Chief Justice John Marshall, is reported to have said at his
retirement, ―John Marshall was my gift to the American people.‖62
I hope we have not reached the point of needing to overhaul the way we
select our judges in Wisconsin. Although I don’t travel around the state as
much as I used to as a member of the state supreme court, I do not have the
sense that the people of Wisconsin are so disgusted by our judicial politics
that they are ready to disenfranchise themselves over the direct selection of
judges. Time and circumstances, however, will give us the answer to that
question.

61. See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 625 (1869).
62. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Supreme Court of the U.S., Remarks at the Federal
Judges Association 2001 Quadrennial Conference (May 8, 2001), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_05-08-01.html.

